Introduction
Holding a person morally responsible for an action requires examining how that action relates to the person’s own decisions, intentions, and control. The fact that someone committed an offense matters, but that fact alone is insufficient to justify punishment. The circumstances of the offense, the degree of control the person exercised over their conduct, the availability of genuine alternatives, and the determining role of any other agent are also relevant to moral responsibility. Performing an action with one’s own hands is not the same as possessing ultimate control over the decision to perform it. If someone assigns another person a particular task, arranges for that task to take place, and then punishes the person for carrying it out, the punisher’s own role must also be subject to moral scrutiny. Where the controller’s power leaves the person performing the action unable to depart from the predetermined result, treating that person as an entirely independent offender becomes especially questionable.
Several important hadith reports concerning Islamic predestination present precisely this problem. They do not merely state that Allah knows who will enter Paradise and who will enter Hell. They state that He created some people for Paradise and others for Hell. He then makes those created for Paradise perform the deeds of its inhabitants and those created for Hell perform the deeds of its inhabitants. Each person dies while performing the relevant deeds and enters the assigned destination because of them. Both the final destination and the deeds presented as its justification are thus linked to Allah’s active arrangement. The same being first creates a person for Hell, then makes that person perform the deeds of the people of Hell, and finally sends that person to Hell because of those very deeds. The moral problem concerns not merely predetermined destiny but the judge’s own active role in producing the conduct for which punishment is imposed.
In Sunan Abi Dawud 4703, a question is raised: if Allah has already created people for Paradise and Hell, what purpose does performing deeds serve? Muhammad replies that Allah employs each person in the deeds appropriate to the destination for which that person was created. The Arabic verb استعمله means to put someone to work or employ them in an activity. Allah’s role here is not confined to knowing the future; He is actively involved in bringing human deeds about.
People act according to their own intentions and are the actual performers of their deeds—a point also acknowledged in mainstream Sunni explanations. Yet if Allah creates those intentions, the ability to act, and the actions themselves, human beings are not the ultimate independent originators of their own will. In particular, where Allah creates a person for Hell and employs that person in the deeds of its inhabitants, His prior decision and effective control cannot be excluded from an assessment of responsibility for the punishable conduct. Performing an act oneself and holding ultimate authority over its occurrence are not the same thing.
Criminal Intent, Control, and Consequences: A Comparison of Two Cases
Consider two incidents side by side. In the first, a man named Karim deliberately plans to kill Rahim. With the specific intention of killing him, Karim attacks Rahim with a sharp knife. He stabs him repeatedly, making every effort to ensure his death. Karim’s intention is unambiguous: he is not trying merely to frighten or mildly injure Rahim. He wants Rahim dead. As it happens, however, a hospital is very close by. Rahim receives treatment quickly, and his life is saved. Despite doing everything he can to accomplish his purpose, Karim fails. Rahim survives because of circumstances beyond Karim’s control.
In the second incident, a man named Quddus suddenly strikes Akkas once with a stick in a fit of anger. Quddus’s assault is undoubtedly deliberate: he chooses to strike Akkas. But he has neither planned nor intended to kill him. Perhaps he only wants to express his anger by inflicting a minor injury. Unfortunately, the blow lands at a particularly vulnerable point, and Akkas dies immediately. Quddus’s action produces a consequence he did not intend. The strike was intentional, but the killing was not.
Which of these two men had the more serious criminal intention? Karim planned to murder another person, carried out repeated attacks to achieve that plan, and tried to make certain the victim died. Quddus, by contrast, deliberately struck someone but did not decide to kill him. Rahim survived Karim’s attack, while Akkas died from Quddus’s blow. The outcomes alone, however, do not make Karim’s murderous intention less serious than Quddus’s. In terms of intent to kill and deliberate planning, Karim’s culpable intention was far more serious, even though his victim survived. Quddus’s act caused a much more severe actual harm, for which his responsibility is also grave. Intent, the dangerousness of the assault, and the harm that actually occurred are all relevant to evaluating the two cases, but they are not interchangeable.
Although Karim’s attempted murder failed, his intention to kill, his planning, and his repeated attacks resulted from his own decisions. Quddus, on the other hand, deliberately inflicted a blow without intending death. The degree of actual harm and the intensity of the intent to kill therefore differ. Moral evaluation of wrongdoing must distinguish intent, control over the act, and its actual consequences; the perpetrator’s intention cannot be inferred from the outcome alone.
In the Islamic accounts of predestination under discussion, the questions of intention and control are even more immediate in Allah’s case. Neither Karim nor Quddus fully knew or controlled the eventual outcome of his actions, whereas nothing occurs outside the determination of an omniscient and omnipotent Allah. If He creates a person for Hell and makes that person perform the deeds of its inhabitants, neither those deeds nor their punitive consequences are unintended accidents from His perspective. A being who arranges for punishable conduct to occur and then judges that conduct cannot have His own intention and control excluded from the assessment of moral responsibility.
Predestination Is Not Merely God’s Foreknowledge, but His Determination
The moral implications of the claim that Allah makes people perform their deeds depend on the extent of His effective role within the Islamic doctrine of predestination. If predestination meant only Allah’s infallible foreknowledge, a further question would remain about the causal origin of human actions: does Allah merely know what people will do, or do their actions also fall within His will and creation? Mainstream Sunni theology accepts the latter position. It identifies four dimensions of divine decree: knowledge (ilm), writing (kitabah), will (mashi’ah), and creation (khalq). Under the first two, Allah knows and records human actions; under the latter two, the actual occurrence of those actions falls under His will and creative power. Human deeds are therefore not independently occurring events of which Allah merely has foreknowledge, but events brought about within His comprehensive will and creation.
Islamweb Fatwa 451591 explicitly explains these four dimensions. It states that divine decree encompasses Allah’s prior knowledge, prior writing, effective will, and creation. Whatever Allah wills occurs, and whatever He does not will does not occur. Crucially, human actions themselves are included in His creation. The same fatwa describes restricting predestination to knowledge and writing alone as an innovation associated with the Qadariyyah. It therefore rejects the idea that human beings independently create their own actions while Allah merely knows about them in advance. [1]
إسلام ويب — كل ميسر لما خلق له
فتوى رقم: 451591
مراتب القدر: العلم والكتابة والمشيئة والخلق
وأنه -عز وجل- شاء ذلك سلفا، ومشيئته نافذة، فما شاء كان، وما لم يشأ لم يكن، وأنه -تعالى- خالق كل شيء، ومن ذلك أفعال عباده.
English translation:
Islamweb — Everyone Is Facilitated Toward That for Which They Were Created
Fatwa No. 451591
The Dimensions of Divine Decree: Knowledge, Writing, Will, and Creation
Allah, exalted is He, willed these matters beforehand, and His will is effective: whatever He wills happens, and whatever He does not will does not happen. He is the Creator of everything, including the deeds of His servants.
This account establishes two distinct relationships between Allah and human conduct. First, no human action can occur outside Allah’s will. Second, the action itself is among the things He creates. The first claim makes Allah’s will a necessary condition of an action’s occurrence; the second makes Him its ultimate creator. Thus, when someone sins, that sin cannot be described as an unexpected event that escaped Allah’s control. Nor can the existence of the sinful act be treated as entirely independent of His creative power. On Islamweb’s own account, every human act, including sin, takes place within a framework in which Allah’s will is effective and He is the ultimate creator of the act.
The moral significance of this distinction is profound. If a person knows in advance that someone else will perform an act, that knowledge alone does not make the observer responsible for producing it. The position of someone who possesses ultimate power over the effective will and creation of the act is different. In Islamic theology, people are the immediate performers of their actions, but the existence of those actions does not arise from an independent creative power of their own. The desire that precedes an action occurs within Allah’s created order, and whether the action can actually occur depends upon His will. Therefore, even if a person makes a conscious decision, that decision cannot be treated as a final cause independent of Allah’s determination. “The person performed the action” describes its immediate execution; “Allah created the action, and it occurred under His will” describes the same event at a more fundamental causal level.
The same Islamweb fatwa does not place human choice outside predestination. It acknowledges that people make choices on the basis of which they are commanded and rewarded or punished, while also stating that these choices are encompassed by Allah’s decree. Rather than describing humans as either wholly independent or wholly compelled, it says they are facilitated toward that for which they were created. The difficulty is precisely what kind of freedom this leaves them. If the existence, effectiveness, and outcome of a person’s choice are subject to Allah’s prior decision, in what sense is that choice independent? Acting according to one’s own wishes is not the same as exercising ultimate control over the origin and consequences of those wishes. The former can exist without the latter.
IslamQA Answer 476800 acknowledges a further, more direct aspect of this problem. It explains that no one can change what was written before creation or depart from that determination. It states that nobody can escape the cosmic order of predestination or contradict what Allah has written for them. The answer also acknowledges that a person’s acts and choices were already known and written. Predestination therefore encompasses not only the eventual result of an act but also the act of choosing it. [2]
الإسلام سؤال وجواب — السؤال رقم: 476800
هل هناك تعارض بين كتابة مصير الإنسان ومطالبته بالعمل؟
وأما في الحديث : ( كل ميسر لما خلق له ) : فإنما هو بيان لـ”قدر” الله جل جلاله، وأن الحكمة الكونية القدرية ، لا يخرج عنها أحد ، ولا يخالف ما كتب الله له .
English translation:
Islam Question & Answer — Question No. 476800
Is There a Contradiction Between a Person’s Predetermined Destiny and the Command to Act?
The hadith, “Everyone is facilitated toward that for which they were created,” describes Allah’s decree. No one can escape the cosmic order of predestination or contradict what Allah has written for them.
On IslamQA’s explanation, human choices and actions fall within Allah’s prewritten order, which no one can escape. People may experience themselves as making decisions, but their choices do not provide an independent means of changing the predetermined result. If someone’s destination in Hell has been fixed irrevocably, their decisions cannot ultimately produce a different final outcome. The experience of choosing and the ability to change a predetermined destination are not the same.
The four dimensions of divine decree make Allah the knower, recorder, willing agent, and creator of human actions. Sunan Abi Dawud 4703 adds that He employs particular people in deeds corresponding to particular destinations. The question, therefore, is not merely whether human beings act according to their own wishes, but what moral basis exists for punishing them as entirely independent offenders when Allah determines the creation and effective occurrence of the very deeds in question?
Created for Paradise and Hell: Allah Makes People Perform Predetermined Deeds
Sunan Abi Dawud 4703 describes the relationship between human deeds and Allah’s role in bringing them about by directly connecting the Creator’s decision, human actions, and the ultimate reward or punishment. The report begins with Adam’s descendants being divided into two groups. Allah creates one group for Paradise and declares that they will perform the deeds of the people of Paradise. He creates the other group for Hell and declares that they will perform the deeds of its inhabitants. This division does not occur after these people have acted; Allah announces their destinations before their lives and deeds have begun. A man then asks what purpose human deeds serve if everything has already been decided in this manner. Muhammad replies that Allah makes those created for Paradise perform the deeds of its inhabitants and those created for Hell perform the deeds of its inhabitants. Each person dies while engaged in the deeds of the respective group and enters that destination on account of those deeds.
The crucial point is that the answer does not make human action independent of Allah’s prior decision. Instead, it explains how human action realizes that decision. First Allah determines who was created for Paradise and who was created for Hell. He then makes the individuals concerned perform deeds appropriate to their destinations. Finally those same deeds are presented as the grounds for reward or punishment. Neither the command to act, the occurrence of the deed, nor its consequence changes the original divine division. Human deeds do not create an alternative to the predetermined destination; they function as the means of reaching it. The Bengali translation expresses the point plainly: Allah makes a servant created for Hell perform the deeds of its inhabitants and admits that servant to Hell because of those deeds. [3] [4]
سنن أبي داود — كتاب السنة — باب في القدر
الحديث: 4703
عَنْ مُسْلِمِ بْنِ يَسَارٍ الْجُهَنِيِّ، أَنَّ عُمَرَ بْنَ الْخَطَّابِ، سُئِلَ عَنْ هَذِهِ الآيَةِ، { وَإِذْ أَخَذَ رَبُّكَ مِنْ بَنِي آدَمَ مِنْ ظُهُورِهِمْ } قَالَ قَرَأَ الْقَعْنَبِيُّ الآيَةَ. فَقَالَ عُمَرُ سَمِعْتُ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم سُئِلَ عَنْهَا فَقَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم “إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ خَلَقَ آدَمَ ثُمَّ مَسَحَ ظَهْرَهُ بِيَمِينِهِ فَاسْتَخْرَجَ مِنْهُ ذُرِّيَّةً فَقَالَ خَلَقْتُ هَؤُلاَءِ لِلْجَنَّةِ وَبِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ الْجَنَّةِ يَعْمَلُونَ ثُمَّ مَسَحَ ظَهْرَهُ فَاسْتَخْرَجَ مِنْهُ ذُرِّيَّةً فَقَالَ خَلَقْتُ هَؤُلاَءِ لِلنَّارِ وَبِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ النَّارِ يَعْمَلُونَ“. فَقَالَ رَجُلٌ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ فَفِيمَ الْعَمَلُ فَقَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم “إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ إِذَا خَلَقَ الْعَبْدَ لِلْجَنَّةِ اسْتَعْمَلَهُ بِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ الْجَنَّةِ حَتَّى يَمُوتَ عَلَى عَمَلٍ مِنْ أَعْمَالِ أَهْلِ الْجَنَّةِ فَيُدْخِلَهُ بِهِ الْجَنَّةَ وَإِذَا خَلَقَ الْعَبْدَ لِلنَّارِ اسْتَعْمَلَهُ بِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ النَّارِ حَتَّى يَمُوتَ عَلَى عَمَلٍ مِنْ أَعْمَالِ أَهْلِ النَّارِ فَيُدْخِلَهُ بِهِ النَّارَ“.
English translation:
Sunan Abi Dawud (Verified Edition)
Book 35: The Sunnah
Chapter: Divine Decree
Hadith 4703
Muslim ibn Yasar al-Juhani narrated that Umar ibn al-Khattab was asked about the verse, “And when your Lord took from the children of Adam—from their loins—their descendants…” (Quran 7:172). Umar said: I heard Muhammad being asked about this verse. He replied that Allah created Adam, then passed His right hand over Adam’s back and brought forth a group of his descendants, saying, “I have created these for Paradise, and they will perform the deeds of the people of Paradise.”
He then passed His hand over Adam’s back again, brought forth another group of descendants, and said, “I have created these for Hell, and they will perform the deeds of the people of Hell.”
A man then asked, “Messenger of Allah, what purpose is there in doing deeds, then?”
Muhammad replied: “When Allah creates a servant for Paradise, He employs that person in the deeds of the people of Paradise. The person dies while performing one of their deeds, and Allah admits the person to Paradise because of it. And when Allah creates a servant for Hell, He employs that person in the deeds of the people of Hell. The person dies while performing one of their deeds, and Allah admits the person to Hell because of it.”
Al-Albani’s grading of the hadith: sahih, except for the passage about passing the hand over Adam’s back.
There is an important distinction between the first and second parts of the report. The first says that those created for Paradise will perform the deeds of the people of Paradise, and those created for Hell will perform the deeds of the people of Hell. This announces what they will do in the future. The answer to the question, however, uses more active language: Allah employs those people in the relevant deeds. The first part announces the future occurrence of the deeds; the second describes Allah’s own role in making those deeds occur. Read together, the two parts do not present human actions as independent events detached from predetermined outcomes. The deeds of those assigned to each destination are brought into conformity with that destination.
It is also significant that the questioner asks precisely why human beings need to perform deeds. He does not ask whether Allah knows the future or how divine knowledge works. The question arises because the division has already taken place: one group was created for Paradise and the other for Hell. What, then, can human deeds change? According to Muhammad’s answer, people will indeed act, but the category of their deeds will correspond to the prior division. Those created for Paradise will be employed in the deeds of its inhabitants, and those created for Hell in the deeds of its inhabitants. Deeds are therefore not presented as an independent process of choosing between still-undetermined destinations. They are the course of conduct through which the appointed destination is reached.
The moment of death is another decisive element of the hadith. It does not merely say that a person will at some point perform the deeds of the people of Paradise or Hell. It says that the person will be employed in those deeds until they die while performing a deed belonging to that category. Thus, the predetermined course of conduct is connected not only to some isolated moment in life but also to its final conclusion. When a person dies, and what kind of deed they are performing at that moment, directly affect the outcome described in the report. If Allah employs someone in the deeds of the people of Hell and that person dies while performing one of those deeds, the final act becomes causally connected to the punishment already appointed. After death there is no further opportunity to change course; the person’s final state becomes the basis of the judgment.
The Arabic report concludes with the phrase فَيُدْخِلَهُ بِهِ النَّارَ, meaning that He admits the person to Hell through, or because of, that deed. The word بِهِ refers back to the preceding deed. Immediately before identifying that deed as the basis for entry into Hell, the report states that Allah employed the person in doing it. This creates a distinct moral problem: human conduct is presented as the ground of punishment, while the same report makes the occurrence of that conduct part of Allah’s active arrangement. The existence of human action is not being denied. The question is whether a person can be treated as an entirely independent moral offender for an action in which Allah has played such a determining role.
Muwatta Malik: The Same Report on Causing Deeds and Death Upon Those Deeds
The same report is preserved in the chapter on predestination in Malik ibn Anas’s Muwatta. The Bengali edition published by the Islamic Foundation explicitly states both that people were created separately for Paradise and Hell and that Allah makes each group perform the deeds appropriate to its destination. In particular, regarding the person created for Hell, it states that Allah makes that person perform the deeds of the people of Hell and that the person dies while engaged in such deeds. The final act before death is not described as the individual’s independent achievement alone; it forms part of the sequence of deeds in which Allah has employed them. [5] [6]
موطأ مالك — كتاب القدر — باب النهي عن القول بالقدر
وَحَدَّثَنِي يَحْيَى عَنْ مَالِك عَنْ زَيْدِ بْنِ أَبِي أُنَيْسَةَ عَنْ عَبْدِ الْحَمِيدِ بْنِ عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ بْنِ زَيْدِ بْنِ الْخَطَّابِ أَنَّهُ أَخْبَرَهُ عَنْ مُسْلِمِ بْنِ يَسَارٍ الْجُهَنِيِّ أَنَّ عُمَرَ بْنَ الْخَطَّابِ سُئِلَ عَنْ هَذِهِ الْآيَةِ وَإِذْ أَخَذَ رَبُّكَ مِنْ بَنِي آدَمَ مِنْ ظُهُورِهِمْ ذُرِّيَّتَهُمْ وَأَشْهَدَهُمْ عَلَى أَنْفُسِهِمْ أَلَسْتُ بِرَبِّكُمْ قَالُوا بَلَى شَهِدْنَا أَنْ تَقُولُوا يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ إِنَّا كُنَّا عَنْ هَذَا غَافِلِينَ فَقَالَ عُمَرُ بْنُ الْخَطَّابِ سَمِعْتُ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ يُسْأَلُ عَنْهَا فَقَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ تَبَارَكَ وَتَعَالَى خَلَقَ آدَمَ ثُمَّ مَسَحَ ظَهْرَهُ بِيَمِينِهِ فَاسْتَخْرَجَ مِنْهُ ذُرِّيَّةً فَقَالَ خَلَقْتُ هَؤُلَاءِ لِلْجَنَّةِ وَبِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ الْجَنَّةِ يَعْمَلُونَ ثُمَّ مَسَحَ ظَهْرَهُ فَاسْتَخْرَجَ مِنْهُ ذُرِّيَّةً فَقَالَ خَلَقْتُ هَؤُلَاءِ لِلنَّارِ وَبِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ النَّارِ يَعْمَلُونَ فَقَالَ رَجُلٌ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ فَفِيمَ الْعَمَلُ قَالَ فَقَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ إِذَا خَلَقَ الْعَبْدَ لِلْجَنَّةِ اسْتَعْمَلَهُ بِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ الْجَنَّةِ حَتَّى يَمُوتَ عَلَى عَمَلٍ مِنْ أَعْمَالِ أَهْلِ الْجَنَّةِ فَيُدْخِلُهُ رَبُّهُ الْجَنَّةَ وَإِذَا خَلَقَ الْعَبْدَ لِلنَّارِ اسْتَعْمَلَهُ بِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ النَّارِ حَتَّى يَمُوتَ عَلَى عَمَلٍ مِنْ أَعْمَالِ أَهْلِ النَّارِ فَيُدْخِلُهُ رَبُّهُ النَّارَ
English translation:
Muwatta Malik
Book 46: Divine Decree
Publisher: Islamic Foundation
Chapter: Prohibition of Disputing About Divine Decree
Hadith 1660, Report 2
Muslim ibn Yasar al-Juhani narrated that Umar was asked about Quran 7:172. Umar said that he had heard Muhammad being asked about it, and that Muhammad replied: Allah created Adam and passed His right hand over Adam’s back, bringing forth his descendants. He said, “I have created these for Paradise. They will perform the deeds of the people of Paradise.” Then He passed His hand over Adam’s back again, brought forth more descendants, and said, “I have created these for Hell. They will perform the deeds of the people of Hell.”
A man asked, “Messenger of Allah, what is the point of performing deeds, then?” Muhammad replied, “When Allah creates a servant for Paradise, He employs that servant in the deeds of the people of Paradise. The servant dies while performing a righteous deed, and the Lord admits that servant to Paradise. And when Allah creates a servant for Hell, He employs that servant in the deeds of the people of Hell. The servant dies while performing a deed of the people of Hell, and the Lord admits that servant to Hell.”
The reports in Abi Dawud and Muwatta Malik are related through the same underlying transmission. Both trace the account through Muslim ibn Yasar al-Juhani to Umar. Their appearance in two collections therefore does not establish two wholly independent eyewitness accounts. The point is that Malik’s collection and Abi Dawud’s collection preserve the same central account: Allah creates people for Paradise or Hell, employs them in the deeds of the respective group, and their lives end while they are performing those deeds. Abi Dawud’s wording makes the relationship between the deed and admission to the destination more explicit through بِهِ (“by it” or “because of it”). Muwatta likewise retains the sequence of divine employment in deeds followed by entry into the appointed destination.
What “Makes Them Do” Means: Allah’s Active Role in Human Actions
The central verb in Sunan Abi Dawud 4703 is اسْتَعْمَلَهُ (ista’malahu). Its root is عمل, “to work” or “to act.” The form استعمل conveys employing someone, putting someone to work, or making use of them to perform an action. The hadith uses the same verb for those created for both Paradise and Hell: اسْتَعْمَلَهُ بِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ الْجَنَّةِ and اسْتَعْمَلَهُ بِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ النَّارِ. The former means Allah employs the person in the deeds of the people of Paradise; the latter means He employs the person in the deeds of the people of Hell. In both constructions, Allah is the grammatical subject of the verb, while the servant is the person employed. The human being performs the act, but the report assigns the active role of putting that person to work to Allah.
Jami at-Tirmidhi 2142 is particularly relevant to understanding this verb because the report itself explains استعمله. Muhammad says, on Anas’s authority, that when Allah intends good for a servant, He employs that servant in a deed. The listeners ask how He does so. The answer is that Allah grants the servant success in performing a righteous deed before death. Three elements follow in order: Allah first intends a good outcome for the servant, employs the servant toward that end, and enables the person to perform a righteous deed before dying. The deed is therefore not simply something the servant completes independently and which Allah subsequently praises. Rather, Allah’s intention and assistance operate before the deed occurs in order to bring about the servant’s favorable final state. [7]
جامع الترمذي — كتاب القدر — الحديث 2142
عَنْ أَنَسٍ، قَالَ قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم “إِذَا أَرَادَ اللَّهُ بِعَبْدٍ خَيْرًا اسْتَعْمَلَهُ”. فَقِيلَ كَيْفَ يَسْتَعْمِلُهُ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ قَالَ “يُوَفِّقُهُ لِعَمَلٍ صَالِحٍ قَبْلَ الْمَوْتِ”.
قَالَ أَبُو عِيسَى هَذَا حَدِيثٌ حَسَنٌ صَحِيحٌ.
English translation:
Jami at-Tirmidhi
Book of Divine Decree
Hadith 2142
Anas narrated that Muhammad said, “When Allah intends good for a servant, He employs that servant.”
He was asked, “How does He employ the servant, Messenger of Allah?”
He replied, “He grants the servant success in doing a righteous deed before death.”
Abu Isa al-Tirmidhi said: This hadith is hasan sahih.
In this report, tawfiq does not mean merely approving an action as good after it has taken place. It refers to making available the capacity, opportunity, and assistance needed for the servant to perform a particular righteous deed before death. The person performs the righteous act, but Allah’s prior intention and active assistance are involved in bringing the person to that action. Allah’s role thus extends beyond determining the outcome and reaches into the process through which the act occurs. The report specifically asks how Allah employs a servant, and answers that He grants the servant the ability to perform a righteous deed before death. The operative meaning of استعمله is established within the religious report itself: Allah employs the servant in a deed that He has willed for that person and that relates to the intended final outcome.
In Mirqat al-Mafatih, Mulla Ali al-Qari explains the same hadith by glossing استعمله as جَعَلَهُ عَامِلًا—“He makes him a doer of deeds.” He explains Allah’s intention of good for the servant in terms of the servant’s favorable final outcome. He then interprets the granting of success in righteous deeds before death as meaning that the person dies in repentance and worship, achieving a good ending. Here the good ending is not simply a retrospective evaluation of the servant’s earlier deeds: Allah employs the servant in conduct upon which that person’s life ends. Al-Qari’s explanation does not reduce استعمله to mere knowledge or prediction; it describes Allah as making the servant an actual performer of deeds. [8]
مرقاة المفاتيح شرح مشكاة المصابيح
الملا علي القاري — الجزء الثامن، الصفحة 3310
الحديث: 5288
5288 – ( وَعَنْ أَنَسٍ أَنَّ النَّبِيَّ – صَلَّى اللَّهُ تَعَالَى عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ – قَالَ : ” إِنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى إِذَا أَرَادَ بِعَبْدٍ خَيْرًا ” ) أَيْ : فِي عَاقِبَتِهِ ( ” اسْتَعْمَلَهُ ” ) أَيْ : جَعَلَهُ عَامِلًا ( ” فِي الطَّاعَةِ ” ) : فَإِنَّهُ الْفَرْدُ الْأَكْمَلُ عِنْدَ إِطْلَاقِ الْعَمَلِ ( ” فَقِيلَ : وَكَيْفَ يَسْتَعْمِلُهُ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ ؟ ” ) أَيْ : وَالْحَالُ أَنَّهُ دَائِمُ الِاسْتِعْمَالِ ( قَالَ : ” يُوَفِّقُهُ لِعَمَلٍ صَالِحٍ قَبْلَ الْمَوْتِ “ ) . أَيْ : حَتَّى يَمُوتَ عَلَى التَّوْبَةِ وَالْعِبَادَةِ ، فَيَكُونَ لَهُ حُسْنُ الْخَاتِمَةِ ، وَزَادَ فِي الْجَامِعِ : ثُمَّ يَقْبِضُهُ عَلَيْهِ.
English translation:
Mirqat al-Mafatih Sharh Mishkat al-Masabih
Author: Mulla Ali al-Qari
Volume 8, page 3310
Commentary on Hadith 5288
Anas narrated that the Prophet said, “When Allah intends good for a servant”—meaning a good final outcome for the servant—“He employs him.” Here, “He employs him” means “He makes him a performer of deeds,” that is, He employs him in acts of obedience. When deeds are mentioned without qualification, obedience represents their most complete form.
He was asked, “How does He employ him, Messenger of Allah?”—that is, given that He continually employs him.
He said, “He grants him success in a righteous deed before death.”
That is, he dies in a state of repentance and worship, thereby achieving a good ending. Al-Jami adds: “Then He takes his soul while he is in that state.”
Al-Qari’s explanation has a direct bearing on the report in Abi Dawud. In Tirmidhi’s hadith, Allah employs a servant in righteous deeds when He intends good for that servant; in Abi Dawud, the same verb is applied to people created for both Paradise and Hell. Tirmidhi 2142 does not separately discuss making people perform the deeds of the inhabitants of Hell. Abi Dawud 4703, however, states that explicitly. Read together, these reports show that استعمله does not inherently denote only good deeds. The category of action—those of the people of Paradise or those of the people of Hell—is specified by the accompanying words. Tirmidhi’s report explains how divine employment in a deed operates in the context of a good ending; Abi Dawud uses the same verb for those created for both destinations.
Abi Dawud uses the same verb استعمله for both categories of people created for Paradise and Hell. Tirmidhi’s account of granting success in a righteous deed before death, together with al-Qari’s explanation of making the servant an actual performer of deeds, clarifies the active force of the verb. For someone created for Paradise, the employment leads toward deeds associated with reward; for someone created for Hell, toward deeds associated with punishment. Both perform deeds through their own actions, but Allah decides in which category of deeds each is employed.
The hadith also states that each person dies upon deeds of that category. The person’s final condition is therefore connected to the assigned destination, while Allah is the one who has employed them in the deeds leading up to that condition. The person may be the immediate performer of the act, but does not exercise ultimate authority over the decision to make that act occur or over its final consequence. When the same being both makes someone perform an action and later uses that action as grounds for punishment, the question of justice is unavoidable.
Human Beings Have a Will—but Allah Creates That Will
Allah’s effective role in human conduct is not limited to the occurrence of the act itself. In mainstream Sunni theology, Allah creates human intentions, the ability to act, and the acts themselves. Before doing something, a person wants to do it, considers various possibilities, and acts according to a decision. But if the capacity to decide and the intention itself depend entirely on Allah’s creation, the decision cannot be independent of His control. The fact that someone acts according to their wishes does not tell us where those wishes came from, who created them, or whether the person had a genuine capacity to wish otherwise. These questions are fundamental when assigning full moral responsibility for the act.
Quran 81:28–29 (Surat al-Takwir) describes the relationship between human will and Allah’s will in two consecutive verses. The first addresses those among human beings who wish to follow a straight path. The next states that people cannot will unless Allah, Lord of the worlds, wills. Thus the first verse acknowledges the existence of human willing, while the second makes that willing dependent on Allah’s will. Human desire is not the final independent decision; even its effectiveness depends upon Allah’s will. [9]
سورة التكوير — الآيتان ٢٨–٢٩
لِمَنْ شَاءَ مِنْكُمْ أَنْ يَسْتَقِيمَ
وَمَا تَشَاءُونَ إِلَّا أَنْ يَشَاءَ اللَّهُ رَبُّ الْعَالَمِينَ
English translation:
Surat al-Takwir, Verses 28–29
“For whoever among you wills to take a straight path.”
“But you cannot will unless Allah, Lord of the worlds, wills.”
IslamQA Answer 20806 distinguishes the creator of human actions from the person who performs them. Quoting Ibn Taymiyyah’s al-Aqidah al-Wasitiyyah, it states that servants genuinely perform their own deeds, but Allah creates those deeds. Servants have the power and will to act, but Allah also creates their power and will. This is not merely a generic assertion about free will; it explicitly places the origins of action, ability, and intention under Allah’s creative power. [10]
الإسلام سؤال وجواب — السؤال رقم: 20806
هل الإنسان مسير أو مخير
قال شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية رحمه الله مبينا مذهب أهل السنة في أفعال العباد : ( والعباد فاعلون حقيقة ، والله خالق أفعالهم. والعبد هو المؤمن والكافر والبر والفاجر والمصلي والصائم. وللعباد قدرة على أعمالهم ، ولهم إرادة ، والله خالق قدرتهم وإرادتهم ، كما قال تعالى ” لمن شاء منكم أن يستقيم. وما تشاءون إلا أن يشاء الله رب العالمين” ) [الواسطية مع شرح هراس ص 65].
English translation:
Islam Question & Answer — Question No. 20806
Is a Human Being Compelled or Free to Choose?
IslamQA quotes Ibn Taymiyyah in explaining the Sunni position:
“Servants genuinely perform their actions, and Allah creates their actions.” The servant is the believer or unbeliever, the righteous or wicked, the one who prays or fasts. “Servants have the power to perform their deeds, and they have a will; Allah creates their power and their will.”
He then cites Allah’s words: “For whoever among you wills to take a straight path,” and “You cannot will unless Allah, Lord of the worlds, wills.”
Ibn Taymiyyah’s statement acknowledges two distinct levels of agency in human action. A person directly performs an act, while Allah creates the ability and will by which it occurs. This matters because being the immediate agent of an act does not make one its ultimate independent source. A person makes a decision through their own thoughts, desires, and preferences. Yet if Allah creates those desires and the capacity for decision-making, the mental process itself does not exist independently of Allah’s prior creation. A person may act through their own decision without possessing independent creative power over the conditions that bring the decision about. Ignoring this distinction treats the immediate performer as the sole source of the entire causal sequence.
The statement that someone acts “of their own free will” can carry two different meanings. First, the person acts according to their desires without external coercion. Second, the person exercises ultimate control over the existence and direction of those desires and decisions. These are not the same. Someone may face no external coercion while their desires, beliefs, preferences, and decision-making processes have been created and determined by an all-powerful being. In that case the action proceeds through the person’s own will, but the will itself does not originate under their ultimate independent control. The absence of external compulsion shows only that the person was not forced from outside; it does not establish that the person is the ultimate creator and controller of their own will.
In Majmu al-Fatawa, Ibn Taymiyyah addresses this distinction more explicitly. He acknowledges a situation in which Allah, by His own will and power, makes a person a being who wills, although that person did not previously choose to become capable of willing. Ibn Taymiyyah does not regard this as inconsistent with the person’s ability to choose. Nevertheless, his own statement establishes an important fact: a human being did not decide to acquire a will before possessing one; Allah made that human being capable of willing. The mental capacity through which later decisions are made is therefore not the product of a prior independent choice by that person. [11]
مجموع فتاوى ابن تيمية
الجزء الثامن — الصفحتان 481–482
فصل العباد لهم مشيئة وقدرة وفعل
وَإِذَا قِيلَ : الْمُرَادُ بِذَلِكَ أَنَّهُ جُعِلَ مُرِيدًا بِمَشِيئَةِ اللَّهِ وَقُدْرَتِهِ بِدُونِ إرَادَةٍ مِنْهُ مُتَقَدِّمَةٍ اخْتَارَ بِهَا أَنْ يَكُونَ مُرِيدًا . قِيلَ لَهُمْ : هَذَا الْمَعْنَى حَقٌّ سَوَاءٌ سُمِّيَ قَسْرًا أَوْ لَمْ يُسَمَّ . وَلَكِنَّ هَذَا لَا يُنَاقِضُ كَوْنَهُ مُخْتَارًا فَإِنَّ مَنْ جُعِلَ مُرِيدًا مُخْتَارًا قَدْ أُثْبِتَ لَهُ الْإِرَادَةُ وَالِاخْتِيَارُ وَالشَّيْءُ لَا يُنَاقِضُ ذَاتَهُ وَلَا مُلَازِمَهُ فَلَا يَجُوزُ أَنْ يُقَالَ كَيْفَ يَكُونُ الْمُخْتَارُ قَدْ جُعِلَ مُخْتَارًا وَالْمُرِيدُ جُعِلَ مُرِيدًا .
English translation:
Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmu al-Fatawa
Volume 8, pages 481–482
Section: Servants Have Will, Power, and Actions
If it is said that this means a person is made capable of willing by Allah’s will and power, without any prior will of their own by which they chose to become a willing being, then the reply is that this meaning is true, whether it is called compulsion or not.
But this does not contradict the person’s being capable of choosing. For one who has been made a willing, choosing person has thereby been granted will and choice. A thing does not contradict itself or its necessary attributes. It is therefore invalid to ask how someone who chooses could have been made capable of choosing, or how someone who wills could have been made capable of willing.
In Ibn Taymiyyah’s account, Allah creates human will, although people still act according to their own decisions. This establishes the existence of willing, not the claim that the human being is the ultimate independent source of that will. No one chose to acquire a will before becoming capable of willing. The desires, dispositions, and decision-making capacity through which subsequent actions occur likewise did not originate from an earlier independent choice by that individual.
Combining this question about the origin of will with Abi Dawud 4703’s account of employment in specific deeds extends the scope of divine control. Creating a general capacity to act is not the same as employing a particular person in the deeds of the inhabitants of Hell. In the latter case, Allah is actively connected to the category of the person’s deeds and the final outcome of dying upon them. The person’s own will then functions as the means through which the predetermined deed is carried out.
Where is the actual ability to reach an opposite final outcome when the same person remains subject to the same will, the same capacities, and an unalterable divine determination? A person can make decisions; but if those decisions cannot produce an outcome outside Allah’s predetermined destination, the experience of deciding does not establish ultimate independence. This limitation cannot be ignored when evaluating moral responsibility for human conduct.
If Allah Makes People Sin and Then Punishes Them, Who Bears Responsibility?
Assessing moral responsibility for an offense requires distinguishing the immediate perpetrator from the agent who exercises determining control over its occurrence. Even if a human being performs a sin, that person’s will, ability, and act are ultimately created under Allah’s authority; in Abi Dawud 4703, Allah also employs the person in deeds leading toward a particular punishment. If the one who imposes punishment also controls the effective conditions that bring the punishable act about, it is inconsistent to place all moral responsibility on the person who performs it. [4]
Knowing that an act is forbidden is not the same as possessing the actual ability to refrain from it and thereby change one’s predetermined fate. A command may demand certain conduct, but the mere existence of that command does not demonstrate that a particular person could have brought about a final outcome contrary to Allah’s unalterable decision. The justice of punishment cannot be established without examining the relationship between the command and the person’s real capacity to comply.
IslamQA Answer 34898 quotes Ibn Uthaymin using examples of everyday human choices. He acknowledges that people choose to ask questions or select a vehicle according to their own wishes. Yet the same explanation states that when a servant wishes to do something and does it, Allah must also have willed that act, since nothing in the heavens or on earth happens outside His will. Even ordinary human decisions thus depend on Allah’s effective will. The fact that people act according to their own wishes and the fact that their actions occur under Allah’s will appear together in the same explanation. [12]
الإسلام سؤال وجواب — السؤال رقم: 34898
الإنسان مسيّر أو مخيّر
والجواب: أن الأمور التي يفعلها الإنسان العاقل يفعلها باختياره بلا ريب واسمع إلى قول الله تعالى : ( فمن شاء اتخذ إلى ربه مآبًا ) وإلى قوله : ( منكم من يريد الدنيا ومنكم من يريد الآخرة) وإلى قوله : ( ومن أراد الآخرة وسعى لها سعيها وهو مؤمن فأولئك كان سعيهم مشكوراً ) وإلى قوله : ( ففدية من صيام أو صدقة أو نسك ) حيث خير الفادي فيما يفدي به.
ولكن العبد إذا أراد شيئاً وفعله علمنا أن الله -تعالى -قد أراده – لقوله – تعالى 🙁 لمن شاء منكم أن يستقيم . وما تشاءون إلا أن يشاء الله رب العالمين ) فلكمال ربوبيته لا يقع شيء في السموات والأرض إلا بمشيئته تعالى .
English translation:
Islam Question & Answer — Question No. 34898
Is a Human Being Compelled or Free to Choose?
The answer is that a rational person undoubtedly performs their actions by choice. Consider Allah’s words: “Whoever wills may take a way back to his Lord”; “Some of you desire this world, while others desire the Hereafter”; “Whoever desires the Hereafter and strives for it as it deserves, while being a believer, will have their efforts appreciated”; and the expiation of “fasting, charity, or sacrifice,” where the person is given a choice of expiation.
But when a servant wills something and does it, we know that Allah, exalted is He, also willed it. This follows from His words, “For whoever among you wills to take a straight path,” and “You cannot will unless Allah, Lord of the worlds, wills.” Because of the perfection of His lordship, nothing occurs in the heavens or on earth except by His will.
Ibn Uthaymin uses examples of everyday decisions to affirm human choice, while also acknowledging that such choices cannot take effect outside Allah’s will. The experience of making ordinary choices does not establish wholly independent moral responsibility in the particular situation of someone created for Hell and employed in the deeds of its inhabitants. Even when a person acts according to their own wishes, the ethical significance of ultimate control over both the will and the act remains relevant if that control belongs to another being.
There is a distinction between an act being prohibited under religious law and the same act occurring within divine decree. Allah may command people to avoid a sin, while the sin cannot occur outside His will within the order of predestination. But the distinction between these two kinds of divine will does not change the causal origin of the act. Prohibiting an action establishes its status under religious law; it does not explain why the action occurred or the extent of Allah’s role in producing it. In particular, when the hadith explicitly describes Allah employing someone in the deeds of the inhabitants of Hell, the existence of a prohibition cannot negate that active role. Morally prohibiting a sin and effectively arranging for that sin to occur are distinct acts; declaring the first does not erase responsibility for the second.
Allah’s claimed omnipotence is equally important. An ordinary person cannot control another person’s every wish, mental ability, circumstance, and future action. Human power is limited, knowledge of others’ decisions is incomplete, and many events lie outside human control. But the Allah of Islamic theology is not subject to such limitations. He could create someone with different abilities, different dispositions, and different circumstances if He willed. Nothing occurs outside His will, and He has the power to employ those created for a particular destination in deeds leading toward it. A person’s sin therefore cannot be characterized as an unavoidable event that occurred against Allah’s will and beyond His creative control. Once such comprehensive power is affirmed, placing the entire moral burden of a punishable act on the human being with limited power creates a profound inconsistency.
Where the causes of an offense and the power to punish are controlled by the same authority, the judge’s own role becomes morally significant. A judge who arranges all the effective conditions for an offense, prevents the accused from acting differently, and then punishes the accused for that offense cannot establish the justice of the ruling simply by pointing to the accused’s conduct. Under the Islamic framework of predestination, Allah’s control is more extensive still: He creates human intentions and capacities, can prevent the act from taking place, and employs particular people in particular categories of deeds.
The consequences of this control are unequal for the two groups created for Paradise and Hell. One is employed in deeds leading to reward, the other in deeds leading to punishment, although neither group chose the destination for which they would be created. Their actions are real, and those actions may cause real harm to others. Yet the need to protect victims and remedy harm does not, by itself, place all ultimate moral responsibility for those actions exclusively on the people who perform them.
A person created for Hell did not choose their destination, the origin of their will, or the predetermined condition in which their life would end. Allah employs that person in the deeds of the people of Hell and punishes them after they die upon those deeds. Where the highest authority over the occurrence and consequences of an act belongs to the punisher, that act cannot consistently be judged as wholly independent wrongdoing for which the human being alone bears moral responsibility.
Punishment for Predetermined Deeds: Does Human Ignorance Remove Allah’s Responsibility?
A person does not know their own future. They do not know what they will do tomorrow, when they will die, or whether they will ultimately enter Paradise or Hell. Amid this uncertainty, people make decisions, choose between good and bad, and try to change their futures. But ignorance of one’s future and the actual power to change it are different matters. If an event is already determined irrevocably, the determination remains unchanged even if the person concerned knows nothing about it. Ignorance may make the person’s experience uncertain, but it does not remove the event’s actual inevitability. This distinction is crucial in the Islamic accounts of predestination: the person’s destiny is unknown to them, but for Allah it is not merely known; it is determined, and He also employs the person in the deeds leading to that outcome.
IslamQA Answer 476800 addresses precisely this question of prewritten destiny and the need for human action. It acknowledges that no one can change what was written before creation or escape that determination. It then argues that because a person does not know their destiny, the person cannot rely on the written decree as a reason to stop acting. Both the choice that someone makes and the deed they choose are already written. The person continues acting because they do not know what has been determined for them. This explanation thus makes ignorance of the future the reason for continuing to act; it does not establish an independent capacity to change the predetermined outcome. [2]
الإسلام سؤال وجواب
السؤال رقم: 476800
هل هناك تعارض بين كتابة مصير الإنسان ومطالبته بالعمل؟
ثانياً:
سر القدر هو أن الإنسان لا يعلم ماذا كتب عند الله، ولا يمكنه الاتكال على الكتاب وترك العمل؛ لأنه لا سبيل إلى العلم به إلا بعد وقوعه، فيلزمه العمل؛ لأنه لا يصح أن يحتج بحجة لا يعلمها.
وهذا من حكمة الله؛ لأنه لو عرف، لحصل الاتكال على القدر، وهذا مناف لحقيقة ما كُتب؛ لأنّ الله تعالى كتبه لعلمه أن الإنسان سيعمل هذه الأعمال ويختارها، فيسرها لها، وليست الكتابة جبرا.. فحياة الإنسان واختياره وعمله كله قد سابق في علم الله.
English translation:
Islam Question & Answer
Question No. 476800
Is There a Contradiction Between a Person’s Predetermined Destiny and the Command to Act?
Second:
The secret of predestination is that a person does not know what Allah has written for them. Therefore, they cannot rely on what is written and abandon action, because there is no way to know it until it has taken place. They must act, since they cannot appeal to an argument they do not know.
This is part of Allah’s wisdom: if the person knew, they would rely on predestination, which would conflict with the reality of what was written. Allah wrote it because He knew the person would perform and choose these actions, and He made them easy for the person. The writing itself is not compulsion. A person’s life, choices, and deeds were all already within Allah’s prior knowledge.
Because people do not know their assigned destination, they decide and act; but that ignorance does not make an unalterable decree changeable. Uncertainty about one’s future is a state of knowledge, whereas the actual ability to alter that future is a causal question. If Allah creates a person for Hell and employs that person in the deeds of its inhabitants, the person’s ignorance does not remove the moral implications of Allah’s decision to employ them in those deeds.
The same IslamQA discussion elaborates on human choice and Allah’s assistance. It says that Allah facilitates the path of the deed the person chooses, and does not equate that facilitation with coercion or compulsion. Yet it also acknowledges that Allah’s will stands above the servant’s will and that He could have prevented the servant from carrying out the chosen act. Allah’s role in the occurrence of the deed is therefore not simply to approve it after the fact: His will is a necessary condition of its realization, and He possesses the power to prevent it. [2]
الإسلام سؤال وجواب
السؤال رقم: 476800
فهذا من تيسير الإتاحة والإعانة والإرشاد، لا من قبيل الجبر والإرغام. فالله عز وجل لما علم أن اختيار هذا العبد للخير أتاح له سبل هذه الاختيار، وهذا ليقدر على فعل ما يختاره، لأنّ مشيئة الله فوق مشيئته، فشاء له أن يحقق اختياره، ولو شاء لمنعه منه. وهذا من حكمته تعالى أن تمام الاختبار مع إعطاء المشيئة والاختيار، وهو مصداق قوله تعالى وَمَا تَشَاءُونَ إِلَّا أَنْ يَشَاءَ اللَّهُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ عَلِيمًا حَكِيمًا [الإنسان: 30].
English translation:
This is facilitation through providing opportunity, assistance, and guidance, not coercion or compulsion. When Allah knew that a servant would choose good, He made the means of that choice available so the servant could perform the act they chose. For Allah’s will is above the servant’s will: He willed that the servant could carry out that choice, and had He willed, He could have prevented it. In His wisdom, the test is completed by granting will and choice. This accords with His words: “You cannot will unless Allah wills. Surely Allah is All-Knowing, All-Wise.” [Quran 76:30]
On IslamQA’s explanation, Allah facilitates the path of a servant’s chosen act and could prevent that act if He wished. But Abi Dawud 4703 says more than that Allah merely provides opportunities to a person created for Hell: it explicitly says He employs that person in the deeds of its inhabitants. The person performs the action, but the being who ultimately controls its effective conditions, the will involved, and its outcome cannot be placed outside moral scrutiny.
People do not know what they will do, whereas Allah knows and causes deeds to take place within His predetermined order. Human ignorance may explain why a person continues to act, but it does not establish the moral legitimacy of the punisher’s own decision. Where a person is employed in punishable conduct and then punished for it, moral responsibility must be assessed with reference both to the immediate performer and to the agent exercising effective control.
Conclusion
In Sunan Abi Dawud 4703, Allah creates people separately for Paradise and Hell, employs them in the deeds of the respective group, and their lives end while they perform those deeds. The verb استعمله and Mulla Ali al-Qari’s commentary clarify the active meaning of this employment. Allah does not merely know the human future: He plays a determining role in the occurrence of the deeds that are subsequently used as grounds for reward or punishment.
Human beings genuinely perform their actions, but in mainstream Sunni theology Allah creates their will, capacity, and actions. Ignorance of one’s destiny may motivate continued effort; it does not establish an independent ability to achieve a final outcome contrary to Allah’s predetermination. If intent and control matter in assigning moral responsibility, the role of the being possessing ultimate control must also be considered.
If Allah creates a person for Hell, makes that person perform the deeds of its inhabitants, and then punishes the person in Hell for those deeds, the very basis of punishment becomes morally inconsistent. The active role of the being within whose predetermined order the punishable act takes place cannot be ignored while the entire responsibility for it is placed solely upon the human being. This arrangement—in which Allah makes someone perform an act and then punishes them for doing it—brings the claims of divine omnipotence and divine justice into conflict.
References
- Islamweb, Fatwa 451591: Everyone Is Facilitated Toward That for Which They Were Created ↩︎
- IslamQA, Answer 476800: Is There a Contradiction Between a Predetermined Destiny and the Command to Act? 1 2 3
- Sunan Abi Dawud (Verified Edition), Hadith 4703, Chapter on Divine Decree ↩︎
- Sunan Abi Dawud 4703 — Arabic Text and English Translation 1 2
- Muwatta Malik, Hadith 1660, Book of Divine Decree, Report 2 ↩︎
- Muwatta Malik, Book of Divine Decree — Arabic Text ↩︎
- Jami at-Tirmidhi 2142, Book of Divine Decree — Allah Employs a Servant in Deeds ↩︎
- Mulla Ali al-Qari, Mirqat al-Mafatih, Vol. 8, p. 3310, Commentary on Hadith 5288 ↩︎
- Quran 81:28–29 — Human Will and the Will of Allah ↩︎
- IslamQA, Answer 20806 — Ibn Taymiyyah on Divine Decree and Human Actions ↩︎
- Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmu al-Fatawa, Vol. 8, pp. 481–482, On Human Will, Ability, and Acts ↩︎
- IslamQA, Answer 34898 — Ibn Uthaymin on Human Choice and Divine Will ↩︎