Introduction
Post-divorce maintenance and housing in Islamic jurisprudence are more than matters of family law; they are deeply connected to unequal power relations, women’s economic dependence, and the social devaluation of domestic labour. In particular, three Sunni schools deny maintenance during the waiting period (‘iddah) to a non-pregnant woman whose divorce is ba’in, meaning that the husband has no unilateral right to revoke it; the predominant Hanbali position also denies her housing. Although the Hanafi school recognises both entitlements during ‘iddah, the question of women’s long-term economic rehabilitation after separation extends beyond that period. A hadith transmitted through Fatimah bint Qays directly attributes to Muhammad the statement that a woman divorced three times is entitled to neither housing nor maintenance. Disagreements over the acceptance and application of this report are recorded among the Companions and later jurists themselves. When the husband’s primary power to divorce unilaterally is combined with rules withdrawing financial responsibility, a serious imbalance emerges between the power to decide on separation and the obligation to bear its economic consequences.
During marriage, a woman may devote her labour, time, and earning opportunities to running the household, raising children, and sustaining her husband’s career. Ending the relationship on paper does not end the consequences of those sacrifices. A lost job, unfinished education, lack of savings, or responsibility for childcare does not disappear with divorce. When the type of divorce, ‘iddah, and pregnancy become the principal determinants of support instead of a woman’s actual circumstances, the limitations of the rules translate directly into a crisis of subsistence.
Terminology and Analytical Approach
Raj‘i and ba’in divorce: In Islamic jurisprudence, raj‘i divorce allows the husband to revoke the divorce during ‘iddah through ruju‘—resuming the marriage without a new marriage contract. In a ba’in divorce, the husband has no unilateral right of revocation. Not every ba’in divorce is a triple divorce; forms of separation such as khul‘ also fall within the relevant juristic discussions. Some legal effects of marriage continue during the ‘iddah of a revocable divorce. There are three principal positions on maintenance and housing for a non-pregnant woman in a ba’in divorce: providing both, providing housing alone, and providing neither.
Maintenance, housing, mahr, and the divorce provision known as mut‘ah are distinct financial matters. Maintenance covers regular living expenses; housing provides accommodation; unpaid mahr is an outstanding entitlement arising from the marriage contract; and mut‘ah is a payment of money or goods upon separation, with disagreements among the schools over when it is obligatory and to whom it applies. Child maintenance, payment for breastfeeding, and remuneration for custody are likewise distinct from a divorced woman’s personal maintenance. Treating one entitlement as though it met every other need distorts the assessment of her actual financial position.
The primary power to pronounce divorce, the avenues available to women seeking separation, and judicial dissolution also have different structures. The husband’s unilateral power of divorce is discussed in a separate Shongshoy article. [1]
What a rule grants and whether that entitlement is fair or sufficient are separate questions. A system may require housing while leaving food and medical expenses unprovided for; it may offer a lump-sum payment without compensating for years of lost earnings. The gap between a rule’s wording and its socioeconomic consequences is the subject of ethical criticism.
The Qur’an: “Do Not Expel Them from Their Homes” and “Provision/Mata‘”
The opening of Surah al-Talaq (65) contains an explicit instruction in verse 65:1: during the waiting period following divorce, “do not expel them from their homes”; nor should the women leave voluntarily. This instruction recognises, in principle, at least a right to housing during ‘iddah. [2]
Surah al-Talaq 65:1
يَا أَيُّهَا النَّبِيُّ إِذَا طَلَّقْتُمُ النِّسَاءَ فَطَلِّقُوهُنَّ لِعِدَّتِهِنَّ وَأَحْصُوا الْعِدَّةَ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ رَبَّكُمْ لَا تُخْرِجُوهُنَّ مِن بُيُوتِهِنَّ وَلَا يَخْرُجْنَ إِلَّا أَن يَأْتِينَ بِفَاحِشَةٍ مُّبَيِّنَةٍ وَتِلْكَ حُدُودُ اللَّهِ وَمَن يَتَعَدَّ حُدُودَ اللَّهِ فَقَدْ ظَلَمَ نَفْسَهُ لَا تَدْرِي لَعَلَّ اللَّهَ يُحْدِثُ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ أَمْرًا
English translation:
O Prophet, when you divorce women, divorce them at the appropriate time for their waiting period, and count the waiting period. Fear Allah, your Lord. Do not expel them from their homes, nor should they leave, unless they commit manifest indecency. These are the limits set by Allah. Whoever transgresses Allah’s limits has wronged himself. You do not know: perhaps Allah will bring about a new situation afterwards.
Verse 6 of the same surah (65:6) instructs men to provide housing according to their means, bear expenses during pregnancy until childbirth, and pay women if they breastfeed their children. This framework—housing, financial support, and remuneration connected to motherhood—offers an initial outline of post-divorce economic security. [3]
Surah al-Talaq 65:6
أَسْكِنُوهُنَّ مِنْ حَيْثُ سَكَنْتُم مِّن وُجْدِكُمْ وَلَا تُضَارُّوهُنَّ لِتُضَيِّقُوا عَلَيْهِنَّ وَإِن كُنَّ أُولَاتِ حَمْلٍ فَأَنفِقُوا عَلَيْهِنَّ حَتَّى يَضَعْنَ حَمْلَهُنَّ فَإِنْ أَرْضَعْنَ لَكُمْ فَآتُوهُنَّ أُجُورَهُنَّ وَأْتَمِرُوا بَيْنَكُم بِمَعْرُوفٍ وَإِن تَعَاسَرْتُمْ فَسَتُرْضِعُ لَهُ أُخْرَىٰ
English translation:
Let them live where you live, according to your means. Do not harm them in order to place them in difficulty. If they are pregnant, bear their expenses until they give birth. If they breastfeed your children for you, pay them their remuneration, and consult one another fairly. If you encounter difficulties with one another, another woman will breastfeed the child for him.
Providing expenses and housing according to one’s means is an obligation here. The limitation lies in its scope: a woman’s lost earnings, educational opportunities, savings, and need for rehabilitation after a long marriage are not directly made criteria for assessment in these instructions. The financial needs of a woman who is not pregnant, is ill, or has spent years outside employment do not diminish because she is not pregnant.
Another important verse, 2:241, introduces the concept of mata‘, or reasonable provision, for divorced women. This verse is a principal basis for later juristic disagreements over the obligatory nature, applicability, and amount of the divorce provision called mut‘ah. [4]
Surah al-Baqarah 2:241
وَلِلْمُطَلَّقَاتِ مَتَاعٌ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ حَقًّا عَلَى الْمُتَّقِينَ
English translation:
For divorced women there is fair provision: a duty upon those who fear Allah.
Conflating maintenance during ‘iddah with the divorce provision of mut‘ah obscures the actual dispute. The former covers living expenses for a specified period; the latter is a separate provision upon separation. Jurists’ decisions about when the latter is an enforceable entitlement, when it is merely encouraged, and when it is unavailable change the amount a woman actually receives. The central problem is the gap between a general declaration of fair provision and effective financial security.
Hadith: Fatimah bint Qays’s Report and Aisha’s Objection
Reports concerning Fatimah bint Qays state that a woman who has received an irrevocable divorce is entitled to “neither housing nor maintenance.” These reports are classified as sahih and form a principal basis for many juristic discussions. Aisha’s objection is also preserved: she rebukes Fatimah for stating that “a divorced woman will receive neither housing nor maintenance.” [5] [6]
Sahih al-Bukhari (Tawhid)
Book: 68 / Divorce
Chapter: 68/41. The Case of Fatimah bint Qays
5323–5324. Narrated Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her): She said: What is the matter with Fatimah? Why does she not fear Allah—that is, in saying that a divorced woman will receive neither food nor housing (from her husband)? (5321, 5322; Adhunik Prakashani: 4932; Islamic Foundation: 4827)
Hadith grading: Sahih (authentic)
Sahih Muslim (Hadith Academy)
Book: 19. Divorce (Talaq)
Chapter: 6. No Maintenance for a Wife Divorced Irrevocably*
3600–(44/…) Muhammad ibn al-Muthanna and Ibn Bashshar (may Allah have mercy on them) ….. It is reported through Fatimah bint Qays (may Allah be pleased with her), from the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), concerning a woman divorced three times. He (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: She is entitled to neither housing nor maintenance. (Islamic Foundation: 3570; Islamic Centre: 3570)
Hadith grading: Sahih (authentic)
These two quotations do not show an identical response to the same ruling. Fatimah’s report denies housing and maintenance; Aisha strongly objects to that statement. The disagreement continued in later jurisprudence. Different uses of these texts have contributed to the same woman’s financial security being recognised in some rulings, partially recognised in others, and entirely denied in still others. For a financially vulnerable woman, this is more than a difference of interpretation: it determines who will bear responsibility for her food and shelter.
Accounts of violence surrounding demands for maintenance also appear in Muhammad’s family life. Muhammad laughs when Umar recounts striking his own wife on the neck; Abu Bakr then strikes Aisha, and Umar strikes Hafsa. The wives’ financial demands and their physical assault by male guardians are linked within the same incident. [7]
Sahih Muslim (Islamic Foundation)
19 / Divorce
Chapter: 4. Giving a Wife a Choice Does Not Constitute Divorce Without the Intention to Divorce
3557. Zuhayr ibn Harb (may Allah have mercy on him) … Jabir ibn Abdullah (may Allah be pleased with him) reported: Abu Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) came and sought permission to enter the presence of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). He found many people seated at his door, but none of them had been permitted to enter. The narrator said: Abu Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) was then granted permission and entered. Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) subsequently came and sought permission, and he too was allowed to enter. He found the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) sitting distressed and silent, with his wives seated around him.
The narrator, Jabir ibn Abdullah (may Allah be pleased with him), said: Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) said: I will certainly say something to the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) that will make him laugh. Then he said: O Messenger of Allah! If only you had seen how Kharijah’s daughter (Umar’s wife, may Allah be pleased with him) asked me for maintenance. I got up, went towards her, and punched her on the neck.Then the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) laughed and said: Those whom you see around me are asking me for maintenance.
Immediately, Abu Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) rushed towards Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her) and punched her on the neck. Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) also stood up, approached Hafsa (may Allah be pleased with her), and punched her on the neck. They both said: You are asking the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) for something he does not have. Then they (the wives of the Prophet, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: By Allah! We will never again ask the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) for something he does not have.
Afterwards, he withdrew from them (his wives) for a month or twenty-nine days. Then this verse was revealed to him (meaning): “O Prophet! Tell your wives: If you desire the enjoyment and luxury of worldly life, then come: I will make provision for your enjoyment and release you graciously. But if you desire Allah, His Messenger, and the Hereafter, then Allah has prepared a great reward for those among you who do good.” (Al-Ahzab: 28–29)
He [Jabir, may Allah be pleased with him] said: He (the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) began with Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her) in implementing the verse’s instruction. He said: O Aisha! I wish to discuss an important matter with you. I would prefer that you not make a hasty decision about it without consulting your parents.
She said: O Messenger of Allah! May I know what the matter is? He then recited this verse to her. She said: O Messenger of Allah! Should I consult my parents about you? (There is no need for that.) Rather, I have chosen Allah, His Messenger, and the Hereafter. But I make one earnest request: please do not tell any of your other wives what I have said. He replied: If any of them asks me about it, I will certainly tell her. For Allah has not sent me to impose hardship or to be obstinate, but as a teacher who makes things easy.
Hadith grading: Sahih (authentic)
Narrator: Jabir ibn Abdullah al-Ansari (may Allah be pleased with him)
The incident Umar chose to make Muhammad laugh was his striking his own wife on the neck for asking for maintenance. A woman expressing a need, her husband responding by beating her, and the memory of that beating being used to entertain another man all form a single sequence. Muhammad laughed on hearing it. The wife’s suffering became a subject of amusement in a conversation between men. The reaction of the man for whom moral leadership is claimed made an incident of wife-beating an occasion for enjoyment. Umar intended to improve Muhammad’s mood by recounting how he had hit his wife, and according to the report, he succeeded. Accepting violence against women as material for male humour plainly reveals the cruelty of failing to regard women as human beings of equal dignity.
Then, as soon as Muhammad mentioned his own wives’ requests for maintenance, Abu Bakr struck Aisha and Umar struck Hafsa. Instead of hearing their daughters’ financial needs, the two fathers responded to their son-in-law’s displeasure by attacking their daughters’ bodies. The paternal family offered no refuge for the daughters’ safety; it functioned as another force controlling them on the husband’s behalf. A father could enter his married daughter’s household and beat her, and the reason for the beating was that she had asked her husband for money. The same authority therefore operated in both relationships: if a woman made a demand of her husband, her father could also arrive to punish her. Before this combined power of husband and father, to whom could she turn with her needs?
While striking them, Abu Bakr and Umar said that the wives were asking Muhammad for something he did not possess. There is no ethical connection between a husband’s financial means and striking his wife. Limited income calls for discussion, accounting, and agreement over household spending. A blow to the neck neither increases income nor clarifies the accounts; it intimidates the person making the demand. The report shows no assessment of how much the wives requested, whether they needed it, or how the family’s resources were distributed. The men’s displeasure became sufficient grounds for assault. Targeting the body of a woman who expresses a need as a means of settling a financial dispute is outright oppression.
After the beating, the wives swore that they would no longer ask Muhammad for what he did not have. This pledge followed immediately after the physical assault. The men therefore did more than express their objection verbally: they obtained a result through blows. Frightening someone into ceasing to repeat a demand is entirely different from resolving it fairly. The wives’ assent was expressed in an atmosphere of violence; there is no basis for treating it as a financial agreement reached through mutual discussion. In place of an account of how far their needs were met, the narrative supplies a promise not to make such demands in future. When economic dependence is combined with physical punishment, merely voicing one’s needs becomes dangerous.
Following the subsequent separation of twenty-nine days or a month, the issue was presented in the language of choosing worldly life or Allah, the Messenger, and the Hereafter. Against the option of receiving financial provision and a gracious release, remaining in Muhammad’s household was associated with choosing Allah, His Messenger, and the Hereafter. A dispute over household expenditure was thus elevated into a question of religious allegiance. The wives were expressing financial needs, but the moral language of the decision was defined through a comparison between worldly desires and rewards in the Hereafter. In this arrangement, maintaining a demand for a better standard of living also carried a spiritual cost: a wife had to position herself opposite the path glorified as choosing Allah and His Messenger. Religious authority thereby gave the husband’s position additional strength in financial negotiations.
The offer to let Aisha consult her parents is also connected to the earlier incident. In this same narrative, her father had previously struck her because of her financial demand. The opportunity to seek his advice therefore offered no guarantee of safe and impartial counsel. A father who beats his daughter on his son-in-law’s behalf may become a source of pressure rather than a support for her independent decision. The experience of physical assault, paternal authority, the prospect of losing the marital relationship, and the appeal of religious reward were all active within the same decision-making environment.
The marriages were still in force when the incident occurred. The women were struck by their fathers in response to raising questions about food, expenses, and living conditions. The report records no rebuke of their beating; Muhammad’s laughter at Umar’s story of striking his own wife is explicitly recorded. Instead of hearing the women’s position and resolving the family’s financial dispute, male physical and religious power prevailed. Abu Bakr’s and Umar’s standing does not justify their blows, and Muhammad’s claim to prophethood does not turn his laughter at wife-beating into a moral ideal. An example of how this beating is religiously glorified can be heard from the prominent Bangladeshi cleric Mizanur Rahman Azhari:
Jurisprudence: The Schools’ Rules on Maintenance and Housing After Ba’in Divorce
There are three principal positions on a non-pregnant woman’s entitlements during ‘iddah after a ba’in divorce. The Hanafis grant both maintenance and housing; the Maliki and Shafi‘i positions retain housing but deny maintenance; the predominant Hanbali position denies both. Ibn Abd al-Barr explicitly records this division. [8]
Al-Istidhkar, paragraph 26796
قال أبو عمر: اختلف العلماء في سكنى المبتوتة ونفقتها على ثلاثة أقوال: أحدها: أن لها السكنى والنفقة، وهو قول الكوفيين. والآخر: أن لها السكنى ولا نفقة لها، وهو قول مالك والشافعي وأكثر أهل الحجاز. والثالث: أنها لا سكنى لها ولا نفقة، هو قول أحمد وطائفة.
English translation:
Abu Umar says: Scholars have differed over the housing and maintenance of a woman divorced irrevocably, holding three positions. The first is that she is entitled to both housing and maintenance; this is the position of the Kufan jurists. The second is that she is entitled to housing but not maintenance; this is the position of Malik, al-Shafi‘i, and most scholars of the Hijaz. The third is that she is entitled to neither housing nor maintenance; this is the position of Ahmad and a group of scholars.
| Entitlements During ‘Iddah After Ba’in Divorce: Non-Pregnant Women | Maintenance | Housing |
|---|---|---|
| Hanafi school | Entitled | Entitled |
| Maliki school | Not entitled | Entitled |
| Shafi‘i school | Not entitled | Entitled |
| Predominant Hanbali position | Not entitled | Not entitled |
There is a practical difference between withdrawing maintenance and withdrawing housing as well. In the first situation, a woman may have somewhere to live while bearing responsibility for food, clothing, and other expenses herself; in the second, even accommodation is not guaranteed. These different outcomes change the degree of risk imposed on her. Likewise, although the Hanafi position provides support during ‘iddah, lost earnings arising from a long marriage and the costs of future rehabilitation are not automatically taken into account.
Al-Mughni: Denying Maintenance and Housing When the Right of Revocation Ends
Ibn Qudamah’s Al-Mughni explicitly contains a rule denying housing and maintenance after a divorce that the husband cannot revoke, with pregnancy as an exception. The wording makes neither the woman’s years of labour nor her ability to become self-supporting a criterion. [9]
The Basic Rule Quoted in Al-Mughni, Issue 6526
وإذا طلق الرجل زوجته طلاقا لا يملك فيه الرجعة، فلا سكنى لها، ولا نفقة، إلا أن تكون حاملا.
English translation:
If a man divorces his wife in a manner that gives him no right of revocation, she is entitled to neither housing nor maintenance, unless she is pregnant.
Under this rule, the question of a woman’s housing and maintenance begins with whether her husband has a right of revocation. Whether she has managed the household for twenty years, left her own employment to facilitate his career, or lacks the money for rent on the day of separation provides no independent basis for maintenance within this rule. Her personal claim to subsistence is denied as her marital classification changes. Even if her hunger, age, and earning capacity remain unchanged, her entitlement changes with the type of divorce. Making her legal relationship to a man so decisive, rather than her human needs, places marital authority above those needs.
This inequality is particularly acute in a husband’s unilateral divorce. The person who can decide to end the relationship can also, through that decision, escape responsibility for regular maintenance and housing. Yet the other party has no equal control over the decision to separate, nor can she immediately cope with the consequences of losing her livelihood. The man’s power to decide and the woman’s obligation to bear the loss are combined within the same rule. Paying expenses for as long as the benefits of marriage are being enjoyed, then ending those payments by changing the relationship’s legal status, leaves the financial inequality created during the marriage unsettled.
When one person’s career advances through the other’s care work and unpaid labour, they do not stand on equal ground at separation. One may retain continuity of employment, experience, and savings; the other may face a career gap and no income. Ending future financial ties while preserving the results of that past arrangement benefits the person who profited from it. Telling a woman to find work again does not restore her lost years. Imposing the costs of the training, time, and housing needed for rehabilitation on her turns her sacrifices for the household into a personal punishment.
The pregnancy exception does not answer the subsistence crisis of a non-pregnant woman. Assessing responsibility for losses caused by marriage requires considering its duration, the division of labour, and lost earnings. The end of the right of revocation is no accounting of that responsibility. This rule does not require an assessment of the woman’s actual financial circumstances before denying regular support; the decision to withdraw her entitlement is therefore detached from her needs.
The Maliki Rule: Accommodation Without Living Expenses
In Al-Mudawwanah, Malik’s statement retains responsibility for housing but denies maintenance to a non-pregnant woman divorced three times. The same passage explains the continuation of maintenance during the ‘iddah of a revocable divorce by stating that the woman is still regarded as a wife. [10]
Al-Mudawwanah: Maintenance and Housing for Divorced Women
قال: قال مالك: السكنى تلزمه لهن كلهن، فأما النفقة فلا تلزم الزوج في المبتوتة ثلاثا، كان طلاقه إياها أو صلحا، إلا أن تكون حاملا فتلزمه النفقة، والنفقة لازمة للزوج في كل طلاق يملك فيه الزوج الرجعة، حاملا كانت امرأته أو غير حامل؛ لأنها تعد امرأته على حالها حتى تنقضي عدتها، وكذلك قال مالك.
English translation:
He said: Malik said: The husband is responsible for providing housing for all of them. But he is not responsible for the maintenance of a woman divorced three times, whether the separation occurs through divorce or a settlement, unless she is pregnant; if she is pregnant, he must provide maintenance. In every divorce in which the husband retains a right of revocation, he is responsible for maintenance whether his wife is pregnant or not, because she continues to be regarded as his wife until her waiting period ends. This is what Malik said.
Accommodation alone, without money for food, clothing, and other needs, does not secure a person’s full subsistence. The legal reason for ending these expenses after a ba’in divorce is the termination of her status as a wife; the rule establishes no separate assessment of her hunger, illness, or earning capacity. Marital classification thus becomes more decisive than the dependence created within the marriage.
The Hanafi Rule: Confinement Also Entails Responsibility for Maintenance
Basing its argument on Qur’an 65:6, the Hanafi school holds that the explicit instruction to provide accommodation during ‘iddah, together with the inseparability of basic living needs from housing, also establishes an entitlement to maintenance during that period, even after a ba’in divorce. Al-Kasani explains that preventing a woman from going out to earn while denying responsibility for her food would leave her facing starvation or hardship. [11]
Bada’i al-Sana’i: The Argument for Maintenance During ‘Iddah
ولأن الأمر بالإسكان أمر بالإنفاق؛ لأنها إذا كانت محبوسة ممنوعة عن الخروج لا تقدر على اكتساب النفقة، فلو لم تكن نفقتها على الزوج ولا مال لها لهلكت، أو ضاق الأمر عليها وعسر، وهذا لا يجوز.
English translation:
The instruction to provide housing is also an instruction to provide maintenance, because if she is confined and prevented from going out, she cannot earn her living. If her maintenance is then not her husband’s responsibility and she has no property of her own, she will perish or face severe difficulty and hardship. This is not permissible.
Al-Kasani’s argument contains an important admission: if a woman without money of her own is prevented from going out to earn, she will face starvation or severe hardship. Economic dependence is not explained here as the result of women’s natural incapacity; it is directly linked to restrictions on movement and the lack of opportunities to earn. The system that confines her must also bear her expenses. The argument establishing her right to maintenance thus contains an admission that her freedom is being restricted. Paying living expenses while exercising authority over someone’s movement and ability to earn constitutes an unequal distribution of power.
Within this framework, a woman is caught between the freedom to build her own livelihood and dependence on her husband’s maintenance. Restricted earning opportunities also weaken her practical ability to leave the household. Acquiring skills, building professional relationships, and accumulating savings in her own name require regular opportunities. Prolonged deprivation of those opportunities compounds financial dependence. Covering expenses during ‘iddah may prevent starvation for that particular period, but it does not meet the full costs of the dependence already created.
The end of ‘iddah marks the end of a period, not a guarantee that earning capacity has been restored. Lifting restrictions on going out does not instantly supply employment, training, or safe accommodation. A woman who has spent a long time outside paid work will need time and money to establish herself again. Covering expenses during confinement and bearing the costs of rebuilding earning capacity after the restriction ends are separate responsibilities. Fulfilling the first while ignoring the second leaves the woman alone to pay the long-term price of control.
This Hanafi argument supports maintenance during ‘iddah for a woman divorced irrevocably. Its ethical limitation lies in the unequal relationship between support and freedom: responsibility for confining her is recognised, but the argument contains no separate accounting for rebuilding the continuity of earnings lost under those conditions. Restricting a woman’s opportunities for self-sufficiency and then making her bear the entire cost of becoming self-supporting allows the beneficiary to evade responsibility. Alongside how long maintenance remains payable, financial responsibility must encompass why she became dependent on it and what it will take to overcome that dependence.
Maintenance During Pregnancy: A Woman’s Right or an Expense for the Unborn Child?
Al-Mughni records another theoretical division over maintenance for a pregnant woman divorced irrevocably: is the expenditure for the woman because she is pregnant, or for the unborn child? Ibn Qudamah records both positions. [12]
Al-Mughni, Issue 6529
وهل تجب نفقة الحمل للحامل من أجل الحمل أو للحمل، فيه روايتان؛ إحداهما: تجب للحمل اختارها أبو بكر؛ لأنها تجب بوجوده، وتسقط عند انفصاله، فدل على أنها له. والثانية، تجب لها من أجله؛ لأنها تجب مع اليسار والإعسار، فكانت له كنفقة الزوجات، ولأنها لا تسقط بمضي الزمان، فأشبهت نفقتها في حياته. وللشافعي قولان، كالروايتين.
English translation:
Is maintenance during pregnancy obligatory for the woman because of her pregnancy, or for the unborn child? There are two positions. The first is that it is for the unborn child; Abu Bakr adopted this view. It becomes obligatory when the pregnancy exists and ends when the child separates from her, indicating that it is for the child. The second is that it is obligatory for her on account of the child, because it is due in both affluence and hardship and, like a wife’s maintenance, does not lapse with the passage of time. Al-Shafi‘i also has two positions corresponding to these two views.
Pregnancy is important in determining financial responsibility under both views. Within this classification, a non-pregnant woman’s needs do not generate an equivalent claim in their own right. Yet inability to support oneself, age, illness, and earning opportunities lost because of marriage do not depend on pregnancy. Tying responsibility for expenses so closely to reproductive status pushes the assessment of women’s other contributions to marriage into the background.
Mut‘ah: Obligatory Entitlement and Voluntary Provision
Providing mut‘ah after divorce is not voluntary in the same sense across all schools. The Shafi‘i work Tuhfat al-Muhtaj discusses obligatory mut‘ah for a woman whose marriage was consummated and who is divorced irrevocably, as well as for a woman whose waiting period after a revocable divorce ends without revocation. It also distinguishes the purposes of mut‘ah and mahr. [13]
Tuhfat al-Muhtaj: The Rule on Mut‘ah and Its Immediate Explanation
(وكذا) تجب (لموطوءة) طلقت طلاقا بائنا مطلقا أو رجعيا وانقضت عدتها على الأوجه؛ لأن الرجعية زوجة في أكثر الأحكام، والمتعة للإيحاش، ولا يتحقق إلا بانقضاء عدتها من غير رجعة، أي وهو حي، فلو مات فيها فلا؛ لما نقل من الإجماع على منع الجمع بين المتعة والإرث.
English translation:
Likewise, mut‘ah is obligatory for a woman whose marriage has been consummated: immediately in an irrevocable divorce, or, according to the more authoritative view, when the waiting period following a revocable divorce ends. In most rulings, a woman divorced revocably remains a wife; mut‘ah addresses the distress of separation, which is realised when her waiting period ends without revocation, while the husband is alive. If he dies during the waiting period, there is no mut‘ah, because a consensus prohibiting the combination of mut‘ah and inheritance has been cited.
The Maliki rule denies judicial compulsion on the same question. The distinction appears directly in Al-Mudawwanah’s answer concerning mut‘ah for a divorced woman whose marriage was consummated and whose mahr had been specified. [14]
Al-Mudawwanah: Questions and Answers on Mut‘ah
قلت: أرأيت المطلقة إذا كان زوجها قد دخل بها وكان قد سمى لها مهرا في أصل النكاح، أيكون لها عليه المتعة في قول مالك؟ قال: نعم، عليه المتعة. قلت: فهل يجبر على المتعة أم لا؟ قال: لا يجبر على المتعة في قول مالك.
English translation:
I said: According to Malik, is a divorced woman whose marriage was consummated and whose mahr was specified in the original marriage contract entitled to mut‘ah from her husband? He said: Yes, he has a duty to give her mut‘ah. I said: Will he be compelled to provide it? He said: According to Malik, he will not be compelled to give mut‘ah.
This exchange in Al-Mudawwanah contains two simultaneous statements: providing mut‘ah is a duty, and a man who refuses will not be compelled to do so. In terms of actual power, the second statement is decisive. If the person who ultimately controls payment is unwilling, a woman cannot secure the money merely by expressing her need. Neither her need nor the commendability of payment supplies an effective remedy against refusal. Financial assistance can therefore remain morally praised while the woman seeking it returns empty-handed.
Dependence on goodwill is particularly dangerous when conflict intensifies between the parties after separation. Waiting upon the favour of the very person from whom one is separating for the money needed to rebuild one’s life creates further subordination. The more urgently a woman needs money, the weaker her bargaining position becomes before a man empowered to refuse it. Repeatedly expressing her needs, trying to appease him, and fearing non-cooperation erode the dignity of asserting an entitlement. An enforceable entitlement offers a legal avenue following refusal; without the power to compel payment, the payer’s discretion becomes the final word.
Here lies the practical gap between the Qur’anic declaration of fair provision for divorced women and the juristic decision not to compel payment in specified cases. However emphatically religious language supports a duty, what a woman can do when it is breached determines her food and shelter. Moral advice delivered to the other party has no purchasing power for the woman who receives no money. In the quoted Maliki ruling, the man’s power to refuse remains intact while the woman’s security is left to his goodwill.
Under the Shafi‘i position, obligatory mut‘ah in the cases mentioned takes the inquiry to the next stage: how much is received, how it can be recovered, and how far it meets the actual loss. Being able to obtain something through a court is not the same as securing rehabilitation proportionate to one’s needs. A lump sum may be insufficient if its amount bears no relation to earnings sacrificed for the household, the woman’s own assets at separation, or the time needed to return to work. One system offers no remedy against refusal; another offers a remedy but leaves the question of adequacy. These specific differences determine the actual value of women’s financial security.
Mahr and Children’s Expenses: A Separate Accounting of Women’s Rehabilitation
A contemporary IslamQA fatwa denies personal maintenance and housing to a non-pregnant woman divorced irrevocably. Contemporary application of this position similarly limits her financial entitlements. [15] [16]
IslamQA, Fatwa 264146
المطلقة طلاقا بائنا لا نفقة لها، ولا سكنى؛ إلا أن تكون حاملا.
English translation:
A woman divorced irrevocably is entitled to neither maintenance nor housing, unless she is pregnant.
Paying outstanding mahr settles an existing contractual entitlement; it cannot be treated as meeting every future need for subsistence. Expenditure on a child’s food and education meets the child’s needs; it is not an accounting of the mother’s own lost income or medical expenses. Without a separate assessment of the losses suffered by a woman whose career has fallen behind because of domestic labour, the labels attached to payments under different headings conceal her personal vulnerability. A woman has a life beyond breastfeeding wages or child-centred benefits; a divorced woman without children likewise needs food, shelter, and rehabilitation.
The Devaluation of Domestic Labour: Economic Reality Versus Legal Rules
Modern economic analysis explicitly recognises unpaid domestic and care work—cooking, maintaining the home, raising children, and emotional labour—as productive labour, although it is not paid a market wage. The International Labour Organization’s 2018 estimate, valuing this work at the minimum hourly wage, places it at approximately 9 per cent of global GDP, equivalent to about US$11 trillion; the dollar figure is expressed in 2011 purchasing power parity terms. The same report states that women perform 76.2 per cent of all hours of unpaid care work. [17]
International Labour Organization, 2018
In no country in the world do men and women provide an equal share of unpaid care work.
English translation:
In no country in the world do men and women contribute equally to unpaid care work.
When a ba’in divorce ends the relationship with limited maintenance and housing only until ‘iddah—or, under some interpretations, without maintenance even during that period—these years of labour acquire no independent basis for compensation. Marriage may be a contract, but its economic effects do not end on the day the contract terminates. Ethically and economically, the arrangement is unequal: why should the burdens of dependence and contribution arising from the relationship fall solely on the weaker party, usually the woman? A husband may retain continuity in his career, income, and savings, while the woman who helped make that continuity possible may be forced to start from nothing.
Another practical problem is that domestic labour disrupts many women’s education or careers, making the expectation of immediate self-sufficiency after divorce frequently unrealistic. According to the ILO’s 2024 estimates, of the 748 million people outside the labour force because of care responsibilities in 2023, 708 million were women and 40 million were men. This inequality in access to earning opportunities intensifies the difficulty a woman faces in rebuilding her livelihood after separation. [18]
International Labour Organization, 2024
Of these, 708 million were women and 40 million were men.
English translation:
Of these, 708 million were women and 40 million were men.
For a woman who has spent ten or twenty years managing a household, finding a new job is not simply a matter of willingness. Age, lack of training, gaps in employment experience, and continuing childcare responsibilities can restrict her earning opportunities. Encouraging a married woman to give up earning opportunities for the household, then imposing the entire burden of immediate self-sufficiency on her after divorce, is hypocrisy. The party that benefited from the family’s arrangement must also bear the costs of the sacrifices accepted for its benefit.
Declaring Domestic Service Non-Obligatory Does Not Eliminate the Accounting for Work Performed
Ibn Qudamah discusses services such as kneading dough, baking bread, and cooking as non-obligatory for a wife. His argument specifies sexual enjoyment as what the woman undertakes to provide under the marriage contract. [19]
Al-Mughni, Issue 5696
وقد روي أن فاطمة أتت رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم تشكو إليه ما تلقى من الرحى، وسألته خادما يكفيها ذلك. ولنا أن المعقود عليه من جهتها الاستمتاع، فلا يلزمها غيره، كسقي دوابه، وحصاد زرعه.
English translation:
It has been reported that Fatimah came to the Messenger complaining of the hardship of operating the millstone and asked for a servant to perform this work for her. Our argument is that what is contracted for on her part is sexual enjoyment; therefore, other work is not obligatory for her, such as watering her husband’s animals or harvesting his crops.
After stating that housework is not obligatory, Ibn Qudamah’s discussion nevertheless encourages women to perform it on the grounds of custom and good conduct. It also acknowledges that this work is necessary for an orderly family life. Cooking and care are thus real needs, women’s labour is expected to meet them, yet that labour is placed outside the list of obligatory contractual services. [20]
Al-Mughni, Issue 5696
ولم يكن ذلك واجبا عليها، ولهذا لا يجب على الزوج القيام بمصالح خارج البيت، ولا الزيادة على ما يجب لها من النفقة والكسوة، ولكن الأولى لها فعل ما جرت العادة بقيامها به؛ لأنه العادة، ولا تصلح الحال إلا به، ولا تنتظم المعيشة بدونه.
English translation:
This work was not obligatory for her. For the same reason, the husband is not obliged to attend to needs outside the home or provide beyond the maintenance and clothing prescribed for her. But it is better for her to perform the work that women customarily undertake, because this is the established practice, circumstances cannot be put right without it, and life cannot be properly organised without it.
The influence of custom matters in this statement. The fact that a task cannot be compelled through a court does not make refusing it equally easy within a household. Associating women with good conduct, proper behaviour, and responsibility for keeping the household running places the social cost of refusing the work upon them. Other family members may regularly enjoy cooking, cleanliness, and care, while the economic value of those benefits remains unaccounted for at separation. Whether the work was obligatory does not answer who actually performed how much labour or who benefited from it.
When a woman prepares food, cares for children, and manages the home, she increases another member’s opportunities to devote time to professional work. Obtaining the same services externally would cost money; sharing the tasks themselves would require family members to sacrifice earning time or leisure. This labour therefore saves household expenses and helps sustain another person’s income. Although the caregiver receives no salary in her own name, the beneficiary retains time and money. Counting only directly earned money as the source of assets at separation excludes the labour that made the household’s income possible. The contribution of the person paid a market wage becomes visible, while the contribution of the person who enabled that person to work falls outside the accounting.
Specifying sexual enjoyment as the woman’s contractual contribution while locating the care she actually provides at the level of custom and good conduct produces an unequal valuation of her contribution. The man’s contractual entitlement in sexual relations is explicit, but compensation for earnings a woman loses through years of labour is not similarly defined. Anyone who regularly benefits from work expected of a woman as proper conduct must also bear responsibility for its economic consequences at separation. Accepting another person’s care to build one’s career, leisure, and savings, then treating her merely as a past volunteer, is exploitative.
An accounting of money paid directly is therefore insufficient for a financial settlement. Alongside who earned income, it matters whose labour created the time and opportunity to earn it. Even if the division of household work was mutually agreed, allowing one person to retain its benefits while the other bears its losses alone is not a fair distribution. Recognising unpaid work as necessary while enjoying its benefits, then disregarding its contribution at separation, widens the gap between male wealth and female dependence.
Institutional Inequality and the “Safety Net” Question
Social security involves two distinct responsibilities: state support—benefits, shelter, and legal protection—and personal financial liabilities arising from marriage. Under rules that impose no obligation to provide regular personal maintenance after ‘iddah, women must unilaterally bear the full risks and economic costs of starting a new life. This directly converts the imbalance in divorce powers, often centred on men, into economic inequality.
The ethical question is clear: should responsibility for dependence created during marriage—reliance on financial security and the sacrifice of a career—not be shared at least minimally after divorce? Otherwise, the rule effectively pushes the weaker party into a punitive economic crisis, even though divorce is permitted under Sharia. The arrangement places the entire burden of women’s economic displacement upon them, which is unacceptable by modern standards of justice.
Directing a former wife towards her father, brother, children, or charitable assistance transfers responsibility for the economic losses created by marriage. Limiting the responsibility of the person who benefited from years of domestic labour and asking other relatives or society to bear the cost evades the question of justice. State support may be necessary, but its availability does not erase the responsibility of the person who benefited from the marriage. Social protection and personal compensation are not substitutes for one another.
Suppose a woman left her job for years to care for children and ill relatives; at separation, she has no home of her own, savings, or immediate income. If she receives support only until the end of a specified waiting period and is then told to make her own arrangements, the long-term cost of losing employment remains hers. Fair support needs to take into account her actual needs, the time required to resume earning, and both parties’ contributions to the marriage.
Without an enforceable entitlement, obtaining support requires repeated appeals, relatives’ approval, and donors’ goodwill. Economic security is therefore also a question of dignity. The difference between claiming what one is owed and pleading for charity to survive is a difference in actual power. Leaving a woman who has contributed to a family for years dependent on uncertain favours after separation devalues her labour and her personhood.
Modern Comparative Law: Support Limited to ‘Iddah Versus Rehabilitation-Based Assistance
Modern state law can determine post-divorce support beyond a short, specified period such as ‘iddah. A woman’s financial incapacity, the time needed for rehabilitation, the length of the marriage, and the other party’s means are practical criteria for assessing the need for support. For example, in its judgment of 10 July 2024 in Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana & Another (2024 INSC 506), the Supreme Court of India ruled that divorced Muslim women, too, may claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Remedies under the 1986 Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act do not extinguish this separate right. [21]
Joint Order of the Supreme Court of India, 10 July 2024
If Muslim women are married and divorced under Muslim law then Section 125 of the CrPC as well as the provisions of the 1986 Act are applicable. Option lies with the Muslim divorced women to seek remedy under either of the two laws or both laws.
English translation:
If Muslim women marry and divorce under Muslim law, both Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of the 1986 Act apply. A divorced Muslim woman may choose to seek a remedy under either law or under both.
The relevance of this judgment lies in making women’s actual subsistence a matter for legal remedy beyond religious classifications of divorce. Financial security is not assured by pointing to a small payment and declaring every obligation discharged without assessing whether the money reasonably meets a woman’s future living needs. Entitlements need to be defined so that a legal declaration of separation cannot become an easy means of exposing someone to starvation or homelessness.
This kind of comparative legal reasoning establishes a fundamental ethical conclusion: post-divorce support should do more than cover ‘iddah or establish pregnancy; it should prevent economic collapse and secure realistic rehabilitation for women. The length of the marriage, care responsibilities, lost earning opportunities, and financial means are therefore important criteria. Whether a lump sum is sufficient, how long regular support is needed, and who will pay for vocational training and housing should be determined on the basis of need. A fixed religious period cannot serve as a substitute accounting for every kind of financial loss a person may suffer.
The Qur’an and Hadith: Interpretive Reconciliation and Its Limits
The dispute over the application of Fatimah bint Qays’s report is preserved in the classical sources themselves. Aisha’s objection, the Hanafi jurists’ argument for both housing and maintenance, the Maliki–Shafi‘i distinction between the two, and the predominant Hanbali denial impose different economic outcomes on the same divorced woman. What she receives depends on which types of divorce jurists consider covered by the general instruction to provide housing, and whether they infer the exclusion of non-pregnant women’s maintenance from the condition concerning pregnancy.
One reason Al-Mughni gives for denying maintenance to a non-pregnant woman divorced irrevocably is that a prohibition which cannot be removed through revocation places her in a position comparable to a woman outside the marital relationship. For a woman divorced revocably, it invokes the continuation of her status as a wife. [22]
Al-Mughni, Issue 6526
ولأن هذه محرمة عليه تحريما لا تزيله الرجعة، فلم يكن لها سكنى ولا نفقة، كالملاعنة أو كالأجنبية، وفارقت الرجعية في ذلك.
English translation:
This woman has become prohibited to him in a way that cannot be removed through revocation; therefore, like a woman separated through li‘an or a woman outside the marital relationship, she is entitled to neither housing nor maintenance. In this respect, she differs from a woman divorced revocably.
The centre of this argument is the woman’s marital status in relation to her husband, rather than her livelihood. The benefits of a shared life were accepted during marriage, but once the right of revocation ends, the financial relationship is treated like that with an outsider. Long-standing dependence, labour performed for the household, and a sacrificed career acquire no independent status as grounds for a claim. Conflating the end of a legal relationship with the end of the losses it produced is a logical error.
Expanding or narrowing the Qur’anic instructions against harm and for financial provision produces concrete social consequences. Recognising housing while excluding responsibility for food meets one need while leaving another uncertain. Treating mut‘ah as an encouragement without an obligation enforceable against refusal makes its receipt dependent on goodwill. Even where ‘iddah expenses are provided, redress for long-term income loss may remain undefined. In assessing a system’s fairness, how far its entitlements actually secure subsistence matters more than nominal declarations of rights.
Conclusion
Among the juristic positions developed around Fatimah bint Qays’s report, maintenance for a non-pregnant woman divorced irrevocably—and, under some views, housing as well—is entirely denied. This creates three serious problems: interpretive conflict with the Qur’anic instruction on housing and the concept of mata‘; failure to make the actual economic value of domestic labour an adequate basis for compensation; and heightened insecurity through imposing a large share of post-divorce economic and social risks on women. Even positions that provide support during ‘iddah or obligatory mut‘ah leave long-term income loss and rehabilitation costs as separate questions.
If post-divorce financial support remains a matter of charity, the weaker party’s security depends on the stronger party’s discretion. Even where mahr or mut‘ah is obligatory in applicable cases, its amount, enforceability, and relationship to actual loss require examination. Enjoying the benefits of years of labour, then covering a short period’s expenses and declaring every responsibility discharged, is no adequate foundation for humane or economic justice.
From the standpoint of reason and justice, it is more consistent to regard post-divorce financial support as a logical consequence of dependence created during marriage, women’s contributions, and basic human security, rather than merely charity or a voluntary favour. A person’s need to survive extends beyond whether she is pregnant or whether revocation remains possible. There is no ethical justification for giving a woman less protection because of her religious identity or the classification of her divorce. Freedom to decide on separation must be accompanied by a fair share of responsibility for its economic consequences.
The Supreme Court of India’s decision discussed above shows that state law can recognise Muslim women’s right to seek relief beyond the limits of ‘iddah. An effective right means an entitlement that can be recovered if denied and whose amount bears a relationship to actual need. Ending a relationship cannot become a licence to drive another person into economic ruin.
References
- Under Islamic Sharia, the Right to Pronounce Talaq Belongs Exclusively to the Husband ↩︎
- Qur’an, Surah al-Talaq 65:1 ↩︎
- Qur’an, Surah al-Talaq 65:6 ↩︎
- Qur’an, Surah al-Baqarah 2:241 ↩︎
- Sahih al-Bukhari, Tawhid Publications, Hadiths 5323–5324 ↩︎
- Sahih Muslim, Hadith Academy, Hadith 3600 ↩︎
- Sahih Muslim, Islamic Foundation, Hadith 3557; international numbering: 1478 ↩︎
- Ibn Abd al-Barr, Al-Istidhkar, paragraph 26796 ↩︎
- Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni, Issue 6526 ↩︎
- Sahnun, Al-Mudawwanah, Kitab Talaq al-Sunnah, “Maintenance and Housing for Divorced Women” ↩︎
- Al-Kasani, Bada’i al-Sana’i: Maintenance and Housing During ‘Iddah ↩︎
- Al-Mughni, Issue 6529, “Maintenance for a Pregnant Woman” ↩︎
- Ibn Hajar al-Haytami, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj, vol. 7, “Chapter on Mut‘ah” ↩︎
- Al-Mudawwanah, “Mut‘ah” ↩︎
- IslamQA, Fatwa 264146 ↩︎
- Arabic text of the same fatwa ↩︎
- International Labour Organization, Care Work and Care Jobs for the Future of Decent Work, 2018, Executive Summary, p. 3 ↩︎
- International Labour Organization, Care Responsibilities and Women’s Labour Force Participation, 29 October 2024 ↩︎
- Al-Mughni, Issue 5696, “A Woman Is Not Obliged to Serve Her Husband” ↩︎
- Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni, Issue 5696: The Subsequent Statement in the Same Discussion of Domestic Service ↩︎
- Supreme Court of India, Mohd. Abdul Samad, 2024 INSC 506, joint order, paragraph c(ii) ↩︎
- Al-Mughni, Issue 6526: The Reasoning Distinguishing Ba’in and Raj‘i Divorce ↩︎